Inspired by the European debt crisis of 2010, this paper provides a theoretical framework to analyze the dynamics of the sovereign debt * This is preliminary indeed. The results have not yet been checked with sufficient care, despite multiple presentations of earlier drafts. We are thankful to our discussants so far. (2008) has shown how "bad luck" can lead to a sovereign debt crisis. Second, Cole-Kehoe (1996 ,2000 have shown how multiplicity of equilibria, when debt enters a "crisis zone" can lead to dramatic changes in debt pricing. Finally, the impatience of policy makers as in Beetsma and Uhlig (1999) provides a reason why a country would be in a crisis zone in the first place. We analyze the unfolding and the debt dynamics, if debt pricing is left to markets alone. Next, we discuss the dynamics, if there is intervention by some bail-out mechanism. We characterize the minimal actuarily fair intervention that restores the "good" equilibrium of Cole-Kehoe, relying on the market to provide residual financing.
Introduction
In 2010, doubts spread on financial markets that Greece will be able to repay its sovereign debt. The prospect of a Greek sovereign default within the Euro zone led to fears of a contagion to other Euro zone member countries, notably Ireland, Portugal and perhaps Spain. Furthermore, a sovereign default within the Euro zone was judged to possibly endanger the European monetary system, its common currency as well as disrupt payment systems within Europe. Due to these concerns, the finance ministers of Europe approved a rescue package for Greece and created the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) in May 2010, in order to prevent a default as well as to return yield spreads to pre-crisis levels. The spreads, however, have remained persistently high and markets appear to judge the prospect of a default and/or an exit from the Euro zone as probable: events may meanwhile have surpassed this description. A survey of the issues and empirics of the situation can be found in Lejour et al (2010) and Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2011) . This paper is motivated by these developments and seeks to understand the dynamics of sovereign debt crises in a union of countries. There are too many pieces here to combine in one single paper. Instead, we shall provide a rather narrow focus. We proceed by first shedding light on sovereign default crises, when combining three key elements of the existing literature. Next, we discuss the dynamics, if there is intervention by some bail-out mechanism. We characterize the minimal actuarily fair intervention that restores the "good" equilibrium of Cole-Kehoe, relying on the market to provide residual financing. "Fair value" here means that the resources provided by the bail-out fund earn the market return in expectation, and therefore does not require drawing on tax payer money on average. We believe this is an important benchmark from which to consider and study more deeply subsidized bailout mechanisms.
The analysis of the dynamics of a sovereign debt crisis builds on and moderately extends three branches of the literature in particular. First, Arellano (2008) has analyzed the dynamics of sovereign default under fluctuations in income, and shown that defaults are more likely when income is low 1 . Tirole (2002) has analyzed the need for liquidity provision in financial crises. Second, Kehoe (1996,2000) have pointed out that debt crises may be self-fulfilling: the fear of a future default may trigger a current rise in default premia on sovereign debt and thereby raise the probability of a default in the first place. Both theories imply, however, that countries would have a strong incentive to avoid default-triggering scenarios in the first place. For example, Greiner et al (2007) have calculated that current debt levels in EMU member countries are probably sustainable in principle. We therefore build on the political economy theories of the need for debt contraints in a monetary union of short-sighted fiscal policy makers as in to provide a rationale for a default-prone scenario.
Indeed, there certainly has not been a lack of analysis and warning of academic economists about the risk of a debt build-up and ensuing problems in a monetary union. Beetsma and Uhlig (1999) point out that "it is hard to imagine the ECB standing by idly, while the debt pileup in a member country ... leands to debt downgrading or default". Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999,2001 ) point out that "monetary unification boosts the accumulation of 1 That may sound unsurprising, but is actually not trivial. Indeed the recursive contract literature typically implies incentive issues for contract continuation at high rather than low income states, see e.g. Ljungqvist-Sargent (2004) .
public debt" and that "international [fiscal] risk sharing may be undesirable because it weakens fiscal discipline". Uhlig (2003) analyzes the scenario of a sovereign default in a monetary union and its repercussion for ECB policy.
Cooper, Kempf and Peled (2010) warn that "regional governments, anticipating central bank financing of their debt obligations, have an incentive to create excessively large deficits.". This brief survey just scratches the surface:
the existing literature is undoubtedly considerably larger.
The literature now moves beyond the stage of warning and instead embarks on sorting through the wreckage. For example, Fink and Scholl (2011) analyze conditionality and bailouts in a quantitative model of sovereign risk.
Gennaioli, Martin and Rossi (2011) examine the implication for bank balance
sheets. This paper seeks to make a contribution to this evolving literature.
A model of sovereign default dynamics
The model combines Arellano (2008) with Cole and Kehoe (2000) , follows much of their specifications and studies the scope for minimalistic "fair value"
bailouts. We assume that there is a single fiscal authority, which finances government consumption c t ≥ 0 with tax receipts y t ≥ 0 and assets B t ∈ I R (with positive values denoting debt, in reverse of the notation used in Arellano (2008) ), in order to maximize its utility
where β is the discount factor of the policy maker, u(·) is a strictly increasing, strictly concave and twice differentiable felicity function, χ t is an exogenous one-time utility cost of default and δ t ∈ {0, 1} is the decision to default in period t. We shall assume that tax receipts y t are exogenous 2 , while consumption, the level of debt and the default decisions are endogenous and chosen by the government.
In Arellano (2008) as well as Cole and Kehoe (2000) , this is the utility of the representative household, y t is total output and c t is the consumption of the household, i.e. the fiscal authority is assumed to maximize welfare.
The structure assumed here is mathematically the same, and consistent with that interpretation. It is also consistent with our preferred interpretation, where the utility function represents the preferences of the policy maker. For example, given the uncertainty of re-election, a policy maker may discount the future more steeply than would the private sector. Spending may be on groups that are particularly effective in lobbying the government. Finally, y t should then be viewed as tax receipts, not national income.
A more subtle, though not essential difference is the cost of a default, modeled here as a one-time utility cost χ t , while it is modelled as a fractional loss in output in Arellano (2008) with Cole and Kehoe (2000) . Note, however, that c t = y t in default, and that at least for log-preferences, u(c t ) = log(c t ), a proportional decline in consumption each period following the default can equivalently be written as a one-time loss in utility.
In each period, the government enters with some debt level B t and the tax receipts y t as well as some other random variables are realized. Traders on financial markets are assumed to be risk neutral and discount future repayments of debt at some return R, and price new debt B t+1 according to some market pricing schedule q m,t (B t+1 ). There may be international assistance ("bailout") in issuing new debt: we shall analyze this only from the receiving country at this point. Denote the assisted pricing schedule with q a,t (B t+1 ) ≥ 0. Given the pricing schedule, the government then first makes a decision whether or not to default on its existing debt. If so, it will experience the one-time exogenously given default utility loss χ t , be excluded from debt markets until re-entry, and simply consume its output, c t = y t in this as well as all future periods, while excluded from debt markets. We assume that re-entry to the debt market happens with probability 0 ≤ α < 1, drawn
iid each period, and that re-entry starts with a debt level of zero. If the government does not default, it will choose consumption and the new debt level according to the budget constraint
where
where 0 < θ ≤ 1 is a parameter, denoting the fraction of debt that currently needs to be repaid. The parameter θ allows to study the effect of altering the maturity structure: the lower θ, the longer the maturity of government debt.
The remainder of the debt θB t will be carried forward, with the government issuing the new debt B t+1 − θB t . In line with the policy of the European Financial Stability Facility, the assistance is given for the new debt only.
There may be additional restrictions outside the formulation above: we shall return to their discussion in section 4.
State space representation
We shall restrict attention to the following state-space representations of the equilibrium. At the beginning of a period, the aggregate state
describes the endogenous level of debt B, the default status d and some exogenous variable z ∈ Z. We assume that z follows a Markov process and that all decisions can be described in terms of the state s. The probability 3 The next constraint may need to depend on whether B t+1 − θB t is positive or negative measure describing the transition for z to z shall be denoted with µ(dz | z).
More specifically, we shall assume that z is given by
We assume that y ∈ [y L , y H ] with 0 < y L ≤ y H either has a strictly positive and continuous density f (y | z prev ), given the previous Markov state z prev or is nonrandom. We assume
either has a strictly positive and continuous density g(χ | d, z prev ), given the previous Markov state z prev and the default state d or is nonrandom. We assume that ζ ∈ [0, 1] is uniformly distributed and denotes a "crisis" sunspot and where ψ ∈ [0, 1] is uniformly distributed and denotes a "bailout" sunspot.
We assume that the distributions of the four entries in z is independent of each other, given the previous state. For most parts, we shall assume that z is iid, and that therefore the distributions for y and χ also do not depend on z prev . For notation, we shall use y(s) to denote the entry y in the state s, etc..
If the government does not default (δ = 0), the period-per-period budget constraint is
where B is the new debt level chosen by the government and where q(B ; s)
is the pricing function for the new debt B .
If the government defaults (δ = 1), the budget constraint is c = y(s)
We assume that the government will be excluded from debt markets until it is given the possibility for re-entry. We assume that re-entry to the debt market happens with probability 0 ≤ α < 1, drawn iid each period, and that re-entry starts with a debt level of zero. Technically, this means that d = 0 in the state s will be turned to d = 1 in the state s following a default, and that d = 1 is followed by d = 1 with probability 1 − α and with d = 0 with probability α. There is no other role for d. The default decision of the government is endogenous and (assumed to be) a function of the state s, δ = δ(s).
We can now provide a recursive formulation of the decision problem for the government. The value function in the default state and after the initial default utility loss is given by
Given the debt pricing schedule q(B; s), the value from not defaulting is
The overall value function is given by
Given parameters, a law of motion for z as well as the assisted debt pricing function q a (B; s) ≥ 0, an equilibrium is defined as measurable mappings q m (B ; s), q(B ; s) in B and s as well as c(s), δ(s) and B (s) in s, such that 1. Given the pricing function q(B ; s), the government maximizes its utility with the choices c(s), δ(s) and B (s), subject to the budget constraint (6) and subject to the exclusion from financial markets for all periods, following a default. 
Debt pricing
This subsection of the analysis follows closely the analysis in Cole and Kehoe (2000) and Arellano (2008) , adapted to the model at hand. Traders on financial markets are assumed to be risk neutral and to discount future debt repayments at some return R. This shall be generalized in section ??. If there has been a default in the past (i.e. if d = 1), then traders assume that the country will also always default in the future 4 . The market price for debt following a default is therefore identical to zero,
Given a level of debt B and no past defaults, let
be the default set, and let
be the set of all z, such that the government will not default and instead, continue to honor its debt obligations: both are (restricted to be) a measurable set, according to our equilibrium definition. The disjoint union of D(B)
and A(B) is the entire set Z. Define the market price for debt, in case of no current default, i.e.
Here and below, we use the notation B(s = (B , 0, z )) to denote the new debt level B(s ), given the new state s = (B , 0, z ). A shorter, more accurate, but perhaps more confusing notation would simply be B((B , 0, z )). Due to risk neutral discounting, this is the market price of debt, if there is no default "today". Define the probability of a continuation next period per
If θ = 0, i.e., if all debt has the maturity of one period only, then
As there may be international assistance in issuing new debt, definē
We need to check, whether there could be a default "today". We shall impose the following assumption. This assumption rules out equilibria, where, say, the market expects a current default, if the government tries to finance some future debt level B , but not for others 5 We now turn to analyzing the possibility for a self-fulfilling expectation of a default. Define the value of not defaulting, if the market prices are consistent with current debt repayment, where it should be noted that the continuation value function is as before,
i.e. given by (9) . Define the value of not defaulting, if the market prices are consistent with a current default, or, more generally, if the assisted market price exceeds the market price at all chosen debt levels :
With that, define two bounds for the current debt levels B, see also figure 2.
Above the upper bound B ≥B(z), the government finds it optimal to default today, even if the market was willing to finance future debt in the absence of a default now, i.e. even if q(B ; s) =q(B ; s). Above the lower bound B ≥ B(z), the government finds it optimal to default, if the market thinks it will do so and therefore is unwilling to finance further debt, q m (B ; s) = 0.
I.e., let
as well as
Whether or not there will be a default at some debt level B between these bounds will be governed by the sunspot random variable ζ. As in Cole-Kehoe (2000), we shall assume that the probability of a default in this range is some exogenously given probability π. Note that the assumption relates endogenous objects to each other.
The equilibrium will therefore look as follows (up to breaking indifference at the boundary points):
1. If B >B(z), the government will default now and not be able to sell any debt. The market price for new debt will be zero.
2. If B(z) ≤ B ≤B(z), the government will (a) default with probability π (more precisely, for ζ(z) < π), and the market price for new debt will be zero, (b) continue with probability 1 − π (more precisely, for ζ(z) ≥ π), and the market price for new debt will beq m (B ; s).
If B < B(z)
, the government will not default, and the market price for debt will be given byq m (B ; s).
Following Cole and Kehoe (2000)
, we shall use the term "crisis zone"
for the maximal range for new debt, for which there might be a "sunspot" default next period, i.e. for
Note that safe debt will be priced at q * satisfying
and is therefore given by
Conversely, given some price q, one can infer the implicit equivalent safe rate
In this section, we exclude assisted debt issuance, i.e. we assume that q a (B ; s) ≡ 0. We therefore furthermore assume, that the bailout sunspot ψ(s) is "irrelevant", i.e. all functions are independent of ψ: it may not be necessary to assume so, but it seems unnecessary to consider it. We finally shall assume that z is iid.
The following results are essentially in Arellano (2008) and states that default incentives increase with higher debt.
Proposition 1 Suppose z is iid and that all functions are independent of ψ. If default is optimal for s (1) = (B (1) , 0, z), then default is optimal for
This is proposition 1 in Arellano (2008).
The next proposition states that lower tax receipts y increases default incentives.
Proposition 2 Suppose z is iid and that all functions are independent of ψ.
Default incentives are stronger, the lower are tax receipts. I.e., for all y
This is the non-trivial insight and proposition 3 in Arellano (2008) and follows similarly from the concavity of u(·). A graphical representation is in figure 1.
In that figure, a pricing function q(B ; s) is taken as given. We are typicallyk considering two pricing functions in particular. Due to the possibility of a sunspot, the pricing function may be q =q m (B ; s) or q ≡ 0. The latter results in a larger default set in the latter case. A graphical representation is in figure 2.
By comparison to proposition 2, the next proposition is certainly more trivial and obvious, and states that less "shame" χ of defaulting results in higher incentives to default. 
, then so is
With these results, we can derive the dependence of the pricing function on the debt level. It is useful to analyze the first-order condition of the government, when considering its choice for the future debt level B , assuming that the debt pricing rule is "sufficiently nice". Define the level of consumption, resulting from a particular debt choice B ,
At the optimal choice, B = B (s) and c(B ; s) = c(s). From there, consider marginally increasing the amount of debt B . This yields a current utility
Per the envelope theorem for v N D , i.e. conditional on a state s of no default, the utility loss tomorrow is given by
where we have used the hopefully intuitive notation B (s ) to denote the debt choice next period, given next periods state s , instead the of the formally correct but possibly confusing notation B (s ). Integrating the losses given by (24) yields
where we have set ζ = 0 and ζ = 1 for the two crisis sunspot situations, and arbitrarily fixed ψ = 0.
However, the set of default states changes. To keep the analysis tractable, suppose that χ is not random but constant, while the distribution for y has a nontrivial, strictly positive and bounded density
With the help of proposition 2, the condition B ≤ B(z) can equivalently written as y ≥ y(B), while the condition B ≤B(z) can equivalently written as y ≥ȳ(B) for some boundsȳ(B) ≤ y(B). Additionally, there is then the net loss in utility due to increasing the risk of default (or, technically, the differentiation with respect to the boundary of the integral), The argument regarding this third part generalizes, in case χ is random too. we note this result as follows. 
where the two pieces are given by (23) and (25). Put differently,
If θ = 0 (only short-term debt), then
where the hazard rate h(B ; s) is given by Nonetheless, for the purpose of some discussions, it may be illuminating to proceed with examining the first-order condition, and assuming that it
The market price q(B ) vs the lhs of (28): The two sides of (28): Even with our narrow focus, there are a variety of choices. The bailout facility may be there "in eternity" or just for several or even one period.
We shall concentrate on the case, where the bailout is there "forever". The bailout facility may buying the entire debt issued by the country, or some smaller amount.
If the bailout facility buys the entire debt, then the solution is easy in principle. It should calculate the π = 0-equilibrium described above, price debt accordingly, q a =q m,π=0 , and let the country choose the debt level it wants, given this pricing schedule. Since the bailout facility is always there, also in the future, to guarantee the "good" equilibrium, the pricing is actuarily fair. While potentially attractive, one may argue, that this solution has two drawbacks. First, the facility might need to be very large. Second, it would need to calculate the pricing functionq m,π=0 , something that competitive markets may do better than governments.
We therefore consider the alternative of a minimal bailout facility. I.e.,
we characterize the minimal level of debt such a facility needs to guarantee buying at the "good equilibrium" price, so that markets must coordinate on the good π = 0 equilibrium. We will have the "good-equilibrium" pricing functionq m,π=0 for the total debt, except that only a certain fraction B a (s) of the total new debt B (s) needs to be purchasable from the facility, while the remainder B (s) − B a (s) must be purchased on the market. The facility can then simply price its own lending at market prices, which is a simple task in principle. What it needs to do, though, is to calculate the appropriate minimal guarantee level B a (s) of lending. It is rather trivial, that any guarantee larger than B a (s), but below the total level B (s) will do the trick just as well. We assume that the facility sets prices to the "good equilibrium" market prices, even if the market does not buy at all: this is only relevant "off-equilibrium". It is important in this construction, that the debt held by the facility is treated the same as the debt held by market participants. It would be interesting to consider extensions, where the debt held by the facility is junior or senior to market-held debt. Note that only a guarantee B a (s)
is needed. The country is indifferent between purchasing this debt from the facility or from the market, and so is the market. The guarantee just needs to be there, in the (now hypothetical) case that the market coordinates on the default outcome.
To characterize the guarantee, we need to re-examine the default decision.
The bailout facility sets the guarantee B a (s). Define
If B a (s) is sufficiently high, we assume that the facility uses this pricing function as the relevant pricing function for the "off-equilibrium" situation, that the market does not provide additional lending. It might be interesting to consider other pricing functions for that scenario: they probably do influence the calculations of B a (s).
Choose some small > 0, to break indifference. Find B a (s) ≥ 0 and the associated pricing function q a (B ; s) of (31), so that
whereB(z) is the maximum level of current debt consistent with no default in the good π = 0 equilibrium. For B >B(z), define B a (s) = 0, but do note, that q a (B ; s) = 0 for any B > 0 per definition ofB(z). In other words, the facility could also provide the (meaningless) guarantee of willing to buy any positive level of debt B a (s) at a zero price, with our assumption (31).
Proposition 6 Suppose B a (s) and q a (B ; s) satisfy (31) and (32), for some > 0. Then, B(z) =B(z), i.e, there will not be a default, unless debt exceeds
B(z).
Proof: to be completed.
•
In the iid case and with a constant embarrassment utility costs χ > 0 of defaulting, a bit more can be said. In that case, some constant value
is the continuation value from defaulting. Likewise, when receiving the full guarantee B a (s), the continuation value of not defaulting is βṽ N D (B a (s)),
given by
comparing the current utility gain from defaulting to the utility continuation loss from defaulting, including the embarrassment cost χ.
Proposition 7
In the iid and constant-χ case, we have
For two states s
Proof: To be completed (and perhaps modified). The first part appears to be obvious. The second part is a version of proposition 2 in Arellano 
A numerical example
This section presents the results of a numerical exercise, where the model is solved using value function iteration (see A for more details). First we discuss the functional forms and parametrization, and then we give the results.
The government's within period utility function has the CRRA form
We assume that the income process is a log-normal autoregressive process with unconditional mean µ log (y t+1 ) = (1 − ρ) µ + ρ log (y t ) + ε t+1 with E (ε) = 0, E (ε 2 ) = σ 2 ε . Table 1 summarizes the parameters used in this exercise. We set the risk aversion parameter, σ, equal to 2, which is within the range of accepted values in studies of business cycles. A period in the model refers to a quarter. The risk-free interest rate is set equal to 1 percent. As in Arellano (2008) , the probability of regaining access to capital markets (ψ) is 0.282. The discount factor β is set to 0.8. We assume that the embarrassment cost, χ, can take three values with equal probability. For the benchmark analysis we set θ equal to 0 (one period bonds) and π equal to 0.005. We analyze both the case when income is iid (ρ = 0) and when it is very correlated (ρ = 0.9). A graphical representation of the third part in Proposition 7 is in Figure   14 : for a given level of B (s), the minimal guarantee level decreases as the level of tax receipts increases. For high levels of income, the government has low default incentives and thus the facility needs to provide a low guarantee.
Another way of representing this result is showin in Figure 16 . 
Conclusions
We have analyzed the dynamics of sovereign debt defaults, drawing on insights from three literatures, particularly Arellano (2008), Cole-Kehoe (2000) and Beetsma-Uhlig (1999) . More precisely, we have analyzed the dynamics of sovereign debt, when politicians discount the future considerably more than We have shown how this can lead to a scenario, where the country perches itself in a precarious position, with the possibility of defaults imminent. We characterized the minimal actuarily fair intervention that restores the "good" equilibrium of Cole-Kehoe, relying on the market to provide residual financing.
A Other bailout mechanisms
Let us now consider the possibility for a bailouts, which may not necessarily be actuarily fair, as an extension of the discussion in the main body of the paper, and as these may be important for certain policy discussions. We shall focus on a few benchmark cases and explore their implications. First, suppose that, for a single period, debt can be sold at some fixed "assisted" price 0 < q a < 1/R to some outside facility, provided the total amount B of debt does not exceed some upper limitB a . This is a bailout and a stylized It may be more interesting to consider a permanent version of this facility: all future borrowing by the country at hand can be done at some fixed price 0 < q a < 1/R, provided the total amount B of debt does not exceed some upper limitB a . In that case, the pricing is given by figure 19. The existence of the borrowing guarantee now removes the doubt of private lenders that the country will be able to borrow tomorrow. As a result, the country debt becomes safe and will be discounted at the usual safe rate R.
The mere promise of the permanent facility results in a markedly reduced market interest on the country debt, provided the promised facility is fully credible.
This may appear to be a wonderful solution. This is so only at first blush, however. Note that the borrowing increases from B (s) to B a (s). Indeed, the country will once again find its perch in the crisis zone of probabilistic default: this time, however, triggered by the debt limit imposed by the facility 8 . The country will borrow privately at the safe return R, until it gets near the imposed debt limit. At that point, credibility on private credit markets collapses as a default is now viewed as likely, the country will borrow one last time, but this time from the facility at the reduced price, and will default in the next period. The proof is by contradiction: if it would not default in the next period (or if such a default would be very unlikely), then it would borrow privately, rather than at the "penalty rate" from the facility. The ensuing debt dynamics is shown in figure 20.
Both scenarios are in conflict with the observation, however, that yields on, say, Greece, Portugese and Irish debt are high and continue to be high, i.e. that there continue to be default fears by private markets. While it is conceivable, that we are simply in that "terminal" period described in the previous scenario, an alternative view here is that the bailout is probabilistic.
This can be modelled in analogy to the default sunspot above. I.e., assume some bailout probability 0 < ω < 1. If the "bailout sunspot" ψ is below ω, ψ < ω, then the country can borrow at the price 0 < q a < 1/R from B B'
Figure 20: The stationary debt dynamics for small income fluctuations and a permanent bailout facility.
the outside facility, provided the total amount B of debt does not exceed some upper limitB a . If the "bailout sunspot" ψ exceeds ω, ψ ≥ ω, then the country must rely on private markets alone.
This will have the effect shown in figure 21 . The level of debt at which a country will now prefer a default in those periods when no borrowing from the facility is possible, has increased compared to the "no bailout ever" scenario, as the country can hope for the option of borrowing from that facility in the future. Therefore, the crisis zone shifts to the right. The debt dynamics is shown in figure 22 . Essentially, this is now a shifted version of the debt dynamics without that facility: rather than repaying the debt, the country shifts to higher debt levels, and the probability of a default is essentially the same as it was before. This takes a bit of time, of course. The facility therefore provides a temporary, but not a permanent resolution of the fiscal crisis. The debt is once again traded at a premium, as before, except that with the pricing functionq(B ) in case of probabilistic bailouts.
the probabilistic bailout means that these higher premium will be afforded at a higher debt level, than without that facility, while avoiding the default.
In essence, these scenarios show that the bailout facility only postpones the day of reckoning. It provides temporary relieve to the country in its desire to maintain a high level of government consumption, but leaves the default situation in a very similar and precarious situation as before, once the initial relief is "used up".
B B'
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A Computational algorithm
We solve the model numerically using a discrete state space method similar to Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) . I discretize the endowment space into 15 equally spaced grids, and the asset space into 300 grids. I assume that the χ cost can take 3 values with equal probability: 0 < χ 1 <.χ 2 < χ 3 .
The computational algorithm consists of the following value function iteration:
1. Assume an initial bond price schedule q 0 = 1 1+r .
2. Use this price function and initial guess for the value functions to solve for the optimal value functions and policy functions.
3. Update the bond price schedule and repeat the previous steps until the price functions converge.
